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Numerical simulation analysis of bargaining solutions is little developed in existing literature. Here
we use a multi country, single period numerical general equilibrium model which captures China and
her major trading partners and examine the outcomes of trade policy bargaining solutions (bargaining
over tariffs and financial transfers) over time as China grows more rapidly than her trade partners.
We compute gains relative to non-cooperative Nash equilibria for a range of model parameterizations.
This yields a measure of both absolute and relative gain to China from bargaining. We calibrate our
model to base case data for 2008 and use a model formulation where there are heterogeneous goods
across countries. The gains from trade bargaining accrue more heavily to other countries when we
use 2008 data rather than later year data.
We then consider the impacts out into the future of different country growth rates which sharply increases
China’s relative size. Our objective is to assess how China’s gains from bargaining change over time;
whether they grow at a faster rate than GDP growth and for which parameterizations. Our simulation
results indicate that China’s welfare gain from trade bargaining will increase over time if countries
keep their present GDP growth rates for several decades, but there are major difference when using
different bargaining solution concepts. These differences have not been noted in existing literature
but have an intuitive explanation. Our results also indicate that if China jointly bargains along with
India, Brazil and other developing countries with the OECD, China’s gain will further increase. Bargaining
gains are also sensitive to country size. When we use PPP to adjust China’s relative GDP size; China’s
trade bargaining welfare gain increases by about 37%.
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China’s trade has grown rapidly in recent decades and has generated large trade 
surpluses, which have financed an accumulation of foreign reserves. Exports have 
become one of its main engines of economic growth which in turn have generated 
adjustment resistance in importing countries. Increasingly over time this will take 
China to more and more trade policy bargaining to try to use access for foreign 
suppliers to the growing Chinese market as the bargaining chip to keep protection 
abroad as low as possible given China’s export lead growth strategy. Given this 
situation, an interesting question to ask is how China’s welfare gains from trade 
bargaining might change over time if countries keep their present GDP growth rates 
and China’s relative size in the global economy progressively grows further. Our 
focus is the impact of growth on bargaining power over several decades. Our aim is 
not only to capture China’s welfare gains from bargaining over time, and to 
investigate China’s future shifting bargaining power, but also assess how calculated 
gains from bargaining behave over time. Do they increase more or less rapidly than 
relative GDP growth? Do they increase at an accelerating rate?   
Existing literature on bargaining is theoretical and analytical rather than 
numerical (Nash, 1950; Johnson, 1965; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975; Rubinstein, 
1982; Roth et al, 1991; Trejos and Wright, 1995; Johnson et al, 2002; Cahuc et al, 
2006; Kennan, 2010). The focus is on bargaining solution concepts and bargaining 
theory, and only a few papers have used numerical techniques to compute bargaining 
solutions (Trifon and Landau, 1974; Calmfors et al, 1988; Coles and Muthoo, 1998; 4 
 
Carpenter, 2002). With the exception of Abrego et al (2001) this numerical literature 
on bargaining does not use general equilibrium structures to numerically solve for 
bargaining outcomes. They are instead mostly based on partial equilibrium models 
and few of them have been used for simulation analyses related to concrete policy 
issues. Our focus and methods, however, differ sharply from Abrego et al (2001) in 
examining the links between bargaining power and growth rather than the links 
between environmental policies and trade bargaining that they explore.   
Our global general equilibrium model captures five countries, each of which is 
endowed with two factors and produces two goods which are heterogeneous across 
countries. Countries are linked through trade and they bargain on their own import 
tariffs which, for simplicity, we assume are at uniform rates across goods imported 
from a country, but can vary across country sources. Since, for now, China’s trade 
partners are more heavily developed countries, we assume China bargains bilaterally 
with the whole of the OECD. Using this model structure, we then explore bargaining 
solution outcomes and simulate welfare gains for each bargaining partner under 
various scenarios which reflect changes in country size as growth proceeds.   
We adopt 2008 as our base year and build a benchmark data set which we use to 
calibrate model parameters. We then analyze China’s welfare gains over time at ten 
yearly intervals from 2010 to 2100 as China’s endowments grow at different rates 
from those of other countries. These gains are computed as a sequence of single 
period comparisons of numerical bargaining solutions using different solution 
concepts (Nash (NBS), Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS)) relative to non-cooperative Nash 5 
 
outcomes to yield measures of country gains from bargaining in both absolute size of 
utility gain and each country’s relative gain. We evaluate China’s welfare gain over 
time using both Nash bargaining and KS bargaining with the OECD, thus yielding the 
change in China’s welfare gain over time from bargaining. We also evaluate China’s 
welfare gain when bargaining jointly with the OECD with India and Brazil. We finally 
compute China’s bargaining welfare gains over time using a purchasing power parity 
(PPP) adjustment for China’s relative size in the 2008 base year data. We additionally 
conduct sensitivity analysis of China’s bargaining welfare gains to elasticity 
parameters.  
Our simulation results show that China’s welfare gains from bargaining with the 
OECD increase over time if all countries keep their present GDP growth rates. Using 
the NB solution concept, China’s share of global bargaining gains grows to 41% in 
2010; 67.7% in 2050 and 88.7% in 2100. This shows growth in bargaining gains at 
roughly the rate of increase in relative GDP. China’s annual average growth rate in its 
trade bargaining welfare gain using Nash bargaining is about 11%, just a little higher 
than its GDP growth rate and the OECD’s is about 6%, higher than its GDP growth 
rate. But using the KS-solution concept, things are different. China’s share of global 
gains is only 10.6% in 2010, but grows much more rapidly to 70.9% in 2050 and to 
99.1% in 2100; initially proportionally smaller but growing much faster, with the 
opposite result for the OECD. This implies important numerical differences when 
using Nash and KS bargaining solution concepts for numerical policy based work. 
With asymmetric shifts in the utility possibility frontier due to growth, Nash 6 
 
bargaining using tangencies between an implicit Cobb Douglas function and the 
frontier, and the KS use of a utopia point proportional to intersections with axes which 
behaves differently. 
Additionally, when China joins with India and Brazil to jointly bargain with the 
OECD or when we use a PPP adjustment for the GDP measure in 2008 for China’s 
base case economic size, China’s welfare gain from bargaining increases by 40% and 
37% compared to the Nash China-OECD bargaining case. Thus, if we take account of 
China’s relative size via purchasing power parity, China’s welfare gain would be even 
larger. It also emerges as a good strategy for China to join with other developing 
countries to jointly bargain with the OECD exerting its bargaining power.   
For computational reasons we use strong assumptions to conduct our analysis, 
and these affect results. One key issue is that we use a balanced trade structure in our 
general equilibrium model which neglects China’s trade surplus position and likely 
over estimates China’s bargaining power since imports are smaller in reality due to 
the surplus. However, this may not be as severe a problem as it may seem because 
although we adjust trade data for each country’s trade to be balanced; for China we 
only change ROW’s exports and imports to yield this result. Trade between China, 
OECD, India and Brazil does not change and are the same as actual data in our 
analysis. The balanced trade structure thus does not fundamentally change China’s 
trade position with OECD, India and Brazil, and may not impact China’s trade 
bargaining power. We do not, however, capture the potential bargaining component 
for China from the strategic use of reserves to drive down exchange rates unless 7 
 
market access for exports is preserved.   
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss China’s current trade 
situation with other countries, and briefly discuss how future growth may change this. 
Section 3 describes the model structure and the bargaining solution concepts we use. 
Section 4 sets out our data used in calibration and reports calibrated parameters. 
Section 5 reports simulation results and computes China’s trade bargaining welfare 
gains for the growth scenarios discussed above. Section 6 offers conclusions, 
implications and final remarks. 8 
 
2. Background to China’s Trade Policy Bargaining   
China’s trade has grown quickly in the past few decades. In 1980, export and 
import values were only US$18.12 billion and US$20.02 billion, and the trade 
imbalance was -1.9US$ billion. By 2010, China’s export and import values had 
increased to US$1577.93 billion and US$1394.83 billion respectively, and the trade 
balance was US$183.1 billion. China’s exports had thus increased 87.1 times and 
imports 69.7 times over 30 years (CSY, 2010).   
Large trade surpluses and export volumes bring trade disputes and China has also 
been one of the largest recipient of trade disputes. In 2010, China’s trade disputes 
included 64 antidumping cases, which covered US$7 billion in exports (MCS, 2010). 
In the presence of these trade disputes, trade policy bargaining naturally occurs. By 
the mid-2000s China was involved in negotiations with 27 countries and regions 
regarding free trade agreements (FTAs) or Closer Economic Partnership Agreements 
(CEPA). These now cover over one-fifth of China’s total trade. China has also signed 
FTAs with the ten-member ASEAN group, Chile, Pakistan and New Zealand and is in 
FTA negotiations with the six-member GCC, the five-member South African Customs 
Union, and also Australia. In addition, China is also looking into the feasibility of 
China–Japan–South Korea, China–Japan and China–South Korea FTAs (Hoadley and 
Yang, 2008).   
In the bargaining process, as we model it, China exchanges access commitments 
to her own market in return for access commitments abroad. Globally joint gains will 
be maximized under free trade, but bargaining can also involve financial transfers 9 
 
which move countries along the global utility possibilities frontier. Bargaining 
outcomes can also be represented analytically using a range of bargaining solution 
concepts. Here we use Nash (1951) bargaining and an alternative solution concept 
proposed by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). We measure the gain to China from trade 
policy bargaining as the utility difference between that achieved under bargaining and 
that represented by a disagreement outcome represented by a non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium. These are computed for the model presented below. Our interest is to 
assess how China’s welfare gains from bargaining might change over time if all 
countries were to keep their current country growth rates over different periods. 
China’s high growth rate relative to other countries is expected to enhance her 
bargaining power.   
China’s trade with developing countries grew quickly over the last 10 years. If 
we take India and Brazil as examples (Figure 1), China’s exports to and imports from 
India increased 26 times and 15 times between 2000 and 2010. Brazil’s trade with 
China has also grown quickly, and in this period the average annual growth rate 
reached 154.5% (UN, 2010). Developing country growth rates of trade with China are 
much higher than the average total trade growth rate for China between 2000 and 
2010 (annually about 25%). But, although China-South trade has grown quickly, 
China’s main export markets remain the developed countries, and we assume China 
gains by cooperating with other developing countries to jointly bargain with 
developed countries through our period of analysis, even though in reality differing 
country growth rates could reverse the incentives.   10 
 































































Source: UN Interactive Graphic System of International Economic Data.   11 
 
3. Model Structure and Bargaining Solutions 
We compute both non-cooperative and cooperative bargaining solutions utilizing 
a 5 country numerical general equilibrium model with each country producing 2 
goods and using 2 factors. We use the Armington assumption of product heterogeneity 
by country in consumption and each country has import tariffs. We numerically 
compute a sequence of Nash equilibria and alternative bargaining solutions over time, 
treating each solution as corresponding to a single period outcome. These numerical 
solutions vary over time due to the higher Chinese growth rate. We compute welfare 
gains from bargaining as the utility difference between cooperative and 
non-cooperative solutions for each period in time and do so for each bargaining 
solution concept. We do this for each country in the model and under different growth 
and size scenarios.   
3.1 Model Structure   
The model has five countries with each country producing two goods with two 
factors. The five countries are China, OECD, India, Brazil and the rest of the world 
(ROW). The two products are tradable goods and non-tradable goods, and the two 
factor inputs are labor and capital.   
On the production side of each economy, we assume CES functions in each 
country and Figure 2 outlines the production structure we use. On the consumption 
side, we assume a one level CES utility function for consumers in each country 
(Figure 2). Under this treatment, individuals choose among domestic and imported 
tradable goods and domestic non-tradable goods. The Armington assumption applies 12 
 
for imported goods. Under this, domestic and imported goods are heterogeneous and 
this removes specialization problems from the model.   
 
          In equilibrium in the model, goods and factor market clearing determine prices 
for goods and factors. The equilibrium conditions are   
,
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where 
j
i Q  and 
j
i D   are production and domestic consumption of good i in country j. 
hj
i M  are imports of good i by country h from country j. 
j
i L and 
j
i K  are labor and 
capital inputs of industry i in country j. 
j
L  and 
j
K  are labor and capital 
endowments in country j. i denotes goods, and j and h country.   
In equilibrium, zero profit conditions must also be satisfied in each industry in 
each country, so that 
jj j j j j
ii L i K i PQ wL wK                                              ( 3 )  
where 
j
i P  denotes the production price of good i in country j, 
j
L w  is the wage in 
country j and 
j
K w   is the price of capital in country j.   
Tradable and Non 
-tradable Goods 
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Fig. 2 Structure of Production and Consumption Functions 13 
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The model assumes balanced trade as is conventional in general equilibrium 
trade models; but we comment later on how to modify the model to account for 
China’s large trade imbalance. Thus, in equilibrium, each country’s export 
expenditures equal its import expenditures, i.e. 
jj h j h j h
ii i i
ih ih
PX P C M j h     ，                                ( 5 )   
where 
jh
i PC  is the consumer price of good i in country j importing from country h. 
Equation (5) is not a condition for equilibrium; it is instead a property of equilibrium 
in our model structure.   
    3.2  Bargaining  Solutions  
We compute both bargaining and non-cooperative solutions to trade policy 
games in the model by including import tariffs in the model. Countries mutually 
consistently set strategically determined tariff rates in a Nash equilibrium and free 
trade with tariffs between countries supporting bargained outcomes with appropriate 
inter country lump sum transfers. For simplicity, in comparisons of Nash equilibrium 
we assume country j has a uniform ad valorem import duty 
j
i t   across goods i, which 14 
 
implies that:   
(1 )
jh j h
ii i PC t P j h    ，                                        ( 6 )   
For the global general equilibrium model set out above, we use a benchmark data 
set to calibrate parameters, then numerically solve for bargaining solutions and 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and then calculate each country’s welfare gain.   
The non-cooperative tariff game we analyze is as originally formulated by Nash 
(1950). After his initial characterization of a bargaining solution (closely related to 
Cournot’s bilateral monopoly formulation) much subsequent work has generated other 
solution concepts. Some of these are surveyed in Roth (1979), Kalai (1985), Peters 
(1987, 1992), and Thomson (1985, 1994).   
Despite the large numbers of solution concepts that have been introduced in the 
literature, three play a central role in theory as it is widely used today (Thomson, 
1994). One is Nash’s original solution concept, which selects the point at which the 
product of utility gains is maximal. The second is a solution concept due to Kalai and 
Smorodinsky (1975) named the KS-solution, which selects the point at which utility 
gains are proportional to their maximal possible values within the feasible utility 
possibilities set. Finally comes the Egalitarian solution (Thomson, 1983) that equates 
utility gains relative to non-cooperative outcomes among players. We use Nash 
bargaining (NBS) and KS solutions as our concepts in solving for bargaining 
outcomes in our model as China’s size grows in the following ways.   
3.2.1 Nash Bargaining Solution 
Our formal statement of Nash’s cooperative two-person bargaining formulation 15 
 
is as follows: Two agents have access to any of the alternatives in a set, called the 
feasible set. Their preferences over these alternatives differ. If they agree on a 
particular alternative, that is what they get. Otherwise, they end up at a prespecified 
alternative in the feasible set, called the disagreement point. Both the feasible set and 
the disagreement point are in utility space. Let them be given by S and d respectively. 
Nash’s objective was to help to predict the compromises that agents would reach. He 
specified a class of bargaining problems which conformed to his analysis, and he 
defined a solution to be a rule that associates with each (S, d) in the class a point in S, 
and interpreted this as the compromise. He formulated a list of properties, or axioms, 
that he thought solutions should satisfy (Thomson, 1994).   
Specifically, the NBS is obtained by maximizing the product of utility gains 
relative to the disagreement point, that is, N(S, d) is the maximization of   
() , ii Max X d X S X d                                          ( 7 )  
Where Xi is the NBS utility of individual i, d is the disagreement point, and  i d  is  the 
disagreement utility for individual i. Figure 3 depicts this solution concept for these 
two cases.   
3.2.2 KS-solution Concept 
The KS-solution concept focuses on utility gains relative to the disagreement 
point as proportional to the agents’ most optimistic expectations. For each agent, these 
expectations are defined as the highest utility they can attain in the feasible set, 
subject to the constraint that no agent should receive less than his coordinate at the 
disagreement point.   16 
 
More precisely, for a given bargaining problem (S, d) we can define the utopia 
point 
** * (,) AB uu u   by  
* {| , } , ii j j u Max u u S u d for i j i A B                                  ( 8 )  
The KS-solution is then given by 
* (,) ( )
KS uS dd ud                                            ( 9 )  
Where  max{ | ( ) } IRd u d S       . In a two-person bargaining case, the 
KS-solution can be described by the solution to:   
*
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where A and B are two bargaining partners. Figure 3 depicts the Nash and  KS 
solutions.  
 
        3.3 Using A Numerical GE Model to Analyze Bargaining and 
Non-cooperative Nash Equilibria 
We first compute non-cooperative equilibria and then using the same 
parameterization of the model for the year at issue explore cooperative bargaining 
outcomes for a sequence of model formulations which vary over time in the size of 

















NB-Solution  KS-Solution 
Fig.3 Two-Person NBS and KS-solution In Utility 17 
 
iterate over calculations of optimal tariff policy responses by individual regions to 
tariff settings of other regions; subject to the constraint of full general equilibrium 
within the period. We then iterate across country tariffs and then countries until 
convergence to a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is achieved. We then compute 
cooperative NBS and cooperative KS solutions associated with these 
parameterizations as the next step.   
In computing cooperative bargaining equilibria, we take the non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium utilities as representing the disagreement point, iteratively generate 
the utility possibilities frontier under cooperation, and apply both the Nash or KS 
criterion to the product of the differences in region utilities along the frontier and 
disagreement utilities (Abrego et al, 2001).   
In computing non-cooperative equilibria, we adopt Nash’s (1951) 
non-cooperative solution concept. In the five-country general equilibrium model, the 
method for computing non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is to iterate over 
calculations of optimal tariffs by individual countries, which are   
() . . i Max u st GE i country                                               ( 1 1 )  
where GE denotes a five country complete general equilibrium. We use (11) to obtain 
convergence to a Nash equilibrium.   
After computing non-cooperative equilibrium tariffs, we can determine the 
disagreement point and then simulate the utilities possibilities frontier under 
cooperation, and apply the Nash bargaining criterion   
(). , ii Max u d st GE i A B                                            ( 1 2 )   18 
 
to obtain the cooperative Nash bargaining equilibrium.   
A solution to (10) determines the KS bargaining outcome. In the process of 
solving for a KS bargaining solution, we need to calculate the utopia point 
utility
** * (,) AB uu u  , which we get by separately maximizing each bargaining partner’s 
utility subject to the constraints of GE.   
3.4 Welfare Gain from Bargaining and Bargaining Power 
The country welfare gain from bargaining is taken to be the utility difference 
between the disagreement point and a NBS or KS-solution. We use 
// NBS KS NBS KS non cooperative
ii ii i gain u d u u i country
                       ( 1 3 )  
to denote the welfare gain from bargaining where 
/ NBS KS
i u  reflects utility in the 
presence of Nash or KS bargaining. We also compute the welfare gain by country 
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This latter index represents a country’s bargaining welfare gain as their share of the 
total bargaining welfare gain. 19 
 
4. Data and Calibration of Model Parameters 
We use calibration of our general equilibrium model to base year data as in 
Shoven and Whalley (1992) to generate the parameters for our model. We take 2008 
as our base year and build a benchmark general equilibrium data set in which, also 
following Shoven and Whalley (1992), all the model general equilibrium conditions 
hold. In this data set, there are five countries China, OECD, India, Brazil and the 
ROW, two sectors involving tradable goods and non-tradable goods, and two factor 
inputs (capital and labor). We take services as non-tradable goods
1 and  manufactures 
as tradable goods as in Abrego et al (2001). We use data for the world minus China, 
OECD, India and Brazil to generate data for the ROW.   
The data we use for the base case equilibrium in model calibration are shown in 
Tables 1 and 2. Chinese data come mostly from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook 
(CSY), OECD data from the OECD statistical database, and India and Brazil data 
from the World Bank database. ROW data are calculated as a residual from world data 
which are taken from the US CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) database. All bilateral 
export and import data come from the UN database and the OECD statistical 
database.  
All data are converted to US$ at market exchange rates. Production, capital and 
trade values in the tables are in billion US$. Export and import values for the OECD 
are less than the sum of country statistics, because we have removed export and 
import values between OECD countries. In numerical general equilibrium analysis, it 
                                                             
1  Non-tradable goods in our calculation includes: (1) wholesale and retail trade, repair, hotels; (2) Financial 
intermediation, real estate, renting and business activity; (3) other service activities.   20 
 
is usual to adjust data so as to set both producer and factor prices equal to 1. We have 
so adjusted each country’s factor input and the ROW’s export and import data.   
Table 1: Base Year Data Used in Calibration and Simulation (2008 Data in $ billions) 
Variables China  OECD India Brazil ROW 
Production 
Tradable 2103.4  13925.9  536.7 546.6  4167.2 
Non-tradable 2222.8  27574.4  622.5  1028.6  5413.4 
Capital 
Tradable  1501.8   13063.4   195.8   378.4   3168.1  
Non-tradable  1202.6   25867.3   227.1   715.2   4674.2  
Labor 
Tradable  601.6   862.5   340.9   168.2   999.1  
Non-tradable  1020.2   1707.1   395.4   313.4   739.2  
Notes: (1) Units for production and capital are billion US$, and units for labor are millions of labor force. (2) We use world values 
minus China, OECD, India and Brazil to generate ROW values. (3) We adjust factor demand data so as to set all factor and production 
prices to equal 1.   
Source: Chinese data from Chinese Statistic Yearbook (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/.); OECD data from OECD database 
(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx.); India and Brazil data except labor from World Bank database “country profile” 
(http://www.worldbank.org/.); Brazil labor data from OECD database (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx.); India labor data from Statistical 
Data of the Reserve Bank of India (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/statistics.aspx.); Total world data are from US Central Intelligence 
Agency “The World Factbook” (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications.).  
 
Table 2: Trade between Countries in 2008 (Units: Billion US$) 
Country 
Import 
China OECD India  Brazil  ROW 
Export 
China /  1093.5 31.6  18.8  923.3 
OECD 457.2  /  99.6  92.7  1441.6 
India 20.3  92.5  /  3.5  49.6 
Brazil 29.9  111.1  1.1  /  82.9 
ROW 625.2  2323  183.4  45.6  / 
        Note: We use total world export and import value minus values for China, OECD, India and Brazil to yield trade for the ROW. We 
have also adjusted ROW’s trade data to make production prices and factor prices equal 1. OECD export and import values here are the 
sum of OECD countries’ export and import values minus the sum of each OECD countries’ exports and imports between OECD 
countries.  
Source: All data for the OECD are from OECD statistics, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=92830; Other export and import data are from 
the UN interactive graphic system of international economic trends (SIGCI Plus), http://www.eclac.org/comercio/ecdata2/index.html.  
The production and utility functions in our model are all CES; and the elasticity 
specification used affects model results. There are no available estimates of 
elasticities for China either on the demand or production side (Dong and Whalley, 
2010). Many of the estimates of domestic and import goods substitution elasticities 
for other countries are around 2 (Betina et al, 2006) and so we set all these elasticities 
in the model equal to 2 (the same as Whalley and Wang (2010)). We later change 
these elasticities in sensitivity analysis to check their impacts on simulation results.   21 
 
    Table 3 reports share and scale parameters generated by calibration. When used 
in model solution these regenerate the benchmark data set as an equilibrium for the 
model, as in Shoven and Whalley (1992).   
Table 3: Parameters Generated by Calibration 
Variable/Country 
China OECD India  Brazil ROW 




K  0.612 0.521 0.796 0.796 0.431 0.431  0.600  0.602   0.640   0.715 
L 0.388    0.479  0.204  0.204  0.569  0.569  0.400  0.398   0.360   0.285 
Scale Parameters 
in Production 




China OECD  India  Brazil  ROW 
China.  T  0.155  0.106 0.005 0.007 0.213 
China.  NT  0.514  0 0 0 0 
OECD.  T  0.026  0.270 0.002 0.002 0.035 
OECD.NT 0  0.664  0  0  0 
India.  T  0.027  0.086 0.306 0.001 0.043 
India.  NT  0  0 0.537 0  0 
Brazil.  T  0.012  0.059 0.002 0.221 0.053 
Brazil. NT  0  0  0  0.653  0 
ROW.  T  0.030  0.218 0.007 0.006 0.174 
ROW.  NT  0  0 0 0  0.565 
Note: T denotes tradable goods; N-T denotes non-tradable goods.   
Source: Calculated using the model structure above and calibration method noted above by the authors.   
In order to calculate bargaining partners’ welfare gains over time from 2010 to 
2100, we use each country’s GDP growth rate in the future. We take each country’s 
average annual GDP growth rate in the last decade (from 2001 to 2010) as the future 
annual factor endowment growth rate in the model for the next 90 years from 2010 to 
2100
2. We assume these growth rates are constant over time, and it is the differential 
growth rates for China and other countries that enhances China’s bargaining power 
over time.   
Countries’ GDP growth rates between 2001-2010 are displayed in Figure 4. We 
take the world growth rate as the ROW growth rate. From these data we see that 
China’s and OECD’s annual average GDP growth rates in the last decade are 10.47% 
and 1.66%; while the growth rates of India, Brazil and ROW are 7.85%, 3.62% and 
2.50% (Table 4).   
                                                             
2  Here we use endowment growth to realize GDP growth in the same rate may not very accurate, the reason is we 
have not taken account of the productivity growth, and some country’s GDP growth may rely more on one factor 
growth.  22 
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Source: OECD data are from OECD statistical database (http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx.); World data from IMF world economic 
outlook database (http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28.); Other countries’ data from World Bank development indicators 
database (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.).  
 
Table 4 Country Annual GDP Growth Rates Assumed in Model Simulations Out to 2100 
Country China  OECD  India  Brazil  ROW 
Annual Growth Rate (%)  10.47  1.66  7.85  3.62  2.5 
Source: calculated by the authors as average annual growth rates of GDP from Fig. 4.   23 
 
5. Simulation Results 
We next report our simulation results. In reality, China’s trade bargaining 
partners are for now mainly developed countries. Even though they may change over 
time with different country growth rates, we assume, for simplicity, that China will 
always bargain with the OECD in all the years considered by our model. Both China 
and its bargaining partner’s welfare gains from bargaining changes over time (from 
2010 to 2100) and are computed using five different scenarios. These are from single 
NBS bargaining with OECD; under KS bargaining solution concepts; for sensitivity 
analysis of gains to elasticities; from China, India and Brazil jointly bargaining with 
the OECD; and from bargaining after a PPP adjustment to China’s and other countries 
size in the base case data. We report these welfare gains in three different ways: in 
value, in shares and average annual growth rates of the gain. These values reflect 
equation (13), and the shares reflect equation (14). The average annual growth rates of 
the welfare gains from bargaining are calculated separately.   
5.1 China’s gain over time under bargaining with OECD 
We first report welfare gains for China from bargaining singly with the OECD 
over time between 2010-2100 with estimates reported for each 10 year period. We 
calculate non-cooperative equilibria and cooperative bargaining solutions for each 
year, and then calculate bargaining gains. Table 5 presents these results for 10 yearly 
intervals between 2010 and 2100.   
Under Nash bargaining, in 2010 the share of the welfare gain for China is 41% 
and the OECD gain is 59%. As China grows, its welfare gain share of the total welfare 24 
 
gain for China and the OECD increases to 67.7% in 2050, with the OECD share 
32.3%. In 2100, China gets 88.7% of the total welfare gain and the OECD gets 11.3%. 
It is thus clear that China’s welfare gain from bargaining will increase over time.   
Table 5 Welfare Gains from China-OECD Bargaining (NB) between 2010 and 2100 
Country 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070  2080  2090  2100 
Share 
China  0.410 0.477 0.548 0.613 0.677 0.732 0.783 0.825 0.859 0.887 
OECD  0.590 0.523 0.452 0.387 0.323 0.268 0.217 0.175 0.141 0.113 
Value 
China 111.6  243.3  518.6  1098.2 2313.8 4816.5 9995.6 20534.8 41890.0 84980.0
OECD  160.4 266.3 428.6 692.4 1106.3 1760.2 2775.5 4368.1 6869.2 10807.1
Average Annual Growth Rate 
China /  11.8%  11.3%  11.2% 11.1% 10.8% 10.8% 10.5% 10.4%  10.3%
OECD / 6.6%  6.1%  6.2% 6.0% 5.9% 5.8% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 
    Source:  Calculated  by  the  authors.  
 

























































Source: Calculated by the authors.   
The welfare gain China receives from NB is 111.6 in 2010, 2313.8 in 2050 (a 
more than 20 times increase), and 84980 in 2100 which is 761 times compared to 
2010. The OECD has a utility gain of 160.4 in 2010, 1106.3 in 2050 which increases 
6.9 times, and 10807.1 in 2100 which increases 67.4 times compared with 2010 
(Figure 5). If we compare China’s welfare gain with that of the OECD, we find that in 
2030 China’s welfare gain will exceed that of the OECD if all countries keep their 
present GDP growth rates. 25 
 














Projected Welfare Gain and Economic Growth Rate (%)
 
Note: EG denote economic growth rate.   
Source: Calculated by the authors.   
5.2 China’s gains over time under KS bargaining solution concepts 
We have also used the KS solution concept to compute China-OECD bargaining 
results and their welfare gains. Table 6 reports welfare gain shares, and value and 
growth rates for both China and the OECD.   
Table 6 Welfare Gains over Time from K/S Bargaining   
Country  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060  2070  2080  2090  2100 
Share 
China  0.106 0.198 0.345 0.530 0.709 0.840 0.919 0.961 0.981 0.991 
OECD  0.894 0.802 0.655 0.470 0.291 0.160 0.081 0.039 0.019 0.009 
Value 
China  28.7  101.1 326.5 949.3 2424.3 5526.8 11738.4 23923.5 47840.3 94921.4
OECD  243.3 408.5 620.7 841.3 995.8 1049.9 1032.7 979.3 918.9 865.7 
Annual Average Growth Rate 
China  /  25.2% 22.3% 19.1% 15.5% 12.8% 11.2% 10.4% 10.0%  9.8% 
OECD  /  6.8% 5.2% 3.6% 1.8% 0.5% -0.2% -0.5% -0.6% -0.6% 
Source: Calculated by the authors.   
China’s share in 2010 is only 10.6%, much smaller than under NB. In 2040 it 
increases to 53% and exceeds that of the OECD. In 2050 China’s share is 70.9% and 
reaches 99.1% in 2100; much larger than NB. On the value side, China’s welfare gain 
is 28.7 in 2010, 2424.3 in 2050 and 94921.4 in 2100; increasing about 84 times and 
3307 times compared to results for 2010. OECD’s gain increases about 4 times by 
2050 and 3.5 times in 2100 compared to 2010. These growth factors are much larger 26 
 
for China under KS than NB, but much smaller for ROW. From the growth results, 
China’s welfare gain grows rapidly in the early years and gradually grows more 
slowly in later years. The OECD gain growth rate is also comparatively higher in the 
early years, but becomes negative after 2070.   

























































Source: Calculated by the authors.   
    When we compare welfare gains for China and OECD using the KS and NB 
solution concepts, we find that before 2050, China’s welfare gains under NBS are 
more than under KS, and OECD’s welfare gain under NBS is less than under KS. But 
after 2050, gains for both China and OECD change to the opposite relationship 
(Figure 7). Welfare gain variation trends do not change under different solution 
concepts.  
We next compare both China and OECD welfare gain shares and growth rates 
under different bargaining solution concepts. These results are reported in Figure 8. 
Share results are the same as for values, and before 2050 China shares are more under 
NBS but after 2050 China’s share is more under KS. The growth rates of welfare 27 
 
gains change a lot for both China and OECD. They are both larger before 2050 and 
become less after 2050. For the OECD, its growth rate becomes negative after 2070.   
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Source: Calculated by the authors.   
These sharp differences in results across these different solution concepts are 
especially interesting since this different numerical behavior of the concepts has not 
been noted in previous literature and has a seemingly intuitive explanation; a link in 
our view which affects the relative attractiveness of the two solution concepts. For the 
KS case, welfare gains reflect bargaining by comparing maximal utility along the 
utility possibility frontier. As China grows and especially in later years after 2050, 
there is an asymmetric shift in the utility possibility frontier and its maximal utility 
will increase much more than the OECD. Under KS, therefore, China will receive 
most of the welfare gain. Under NBS, the product of each partner’s utility gain is 
maximized. This allocates the total welfare gain by region without paying attention to 
the asymmetric utility possibility frontier shift. Thus China’s welfare gain after 2050 28 
 
is much less under NB than under the KS solution concept.   
These different bargaining results thus give sharply different values showing a 
major numerical difference in bargaining solution concepts between NBS and 
KS-solutions. As we indicate above, these sharp differences in numerical behavior 
have not been noted in existing research literature.   
        5.3 The Sensitivity of China’s Bargaining Gains to Elasticities 
We check the sensitivity of China’s and OECD’s welfare gain values to 
elasticities in single China-OECD Nash bargaining in this part. These results can help 
us assess the robustness of our simulation results.   
Table 7 Sensitivity of Welfare Gains from Bargaining to Elasticities of Substitution 
Year  \  Elasticity  1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 
China  
2010  48.9  54.4  111.6 143.4 159.1 
2020  94.0  123.7 243.3 307.5 337.2 
2030  199.0 267.8 518.6 647.2 703.1 
2040 429.5  576.9  1098.2  1351.2  1452.7 
2050  937.5  1240.8 2313.8 2801.2 2978.1 
2060  2100.5 2627.9 4816.5 5739.2 6034.9 
2070  4648.0 5602.1 9995.6  11691.8  12147.5 
2080  10280.3 11866.5 20534.8 23555.0 24179.2 
2090  22121.7 25277.0 41890.0 46980.0 47600.0 
2100  45440.0 54490.0 84980.0 92790.0 92660.0 
OECD  
2010  135.4  47.7  160.4 224.7 256.7 
2020  182.5  95.6  266.3 364.2 413.5 
2030  247.8 168.8 428.6 580.2 658.7 
2040  319.2 297.7 692.4 927.4  1052.6 
2050 403.0  505.3  1106.3  1472.3  1673.3 
2060 495.3  841.1  1760.2  2332.9  2656.2 
2070  604.3  1363.2 2775.5 3674.4 4194.2 
2080  729.4  2181.3 4368.1 5785.6 6619.7 
2090  877.3  3454.3 6869.2 9111.5  10442.9 
2100  1075.1  5418.5  10807.1 14369.8 16481.7 
    Note: For simplicity, we just change elasticities in the last simulated non-cooperative equilibrium utility and 
NBS utility stage to check the sensitivity of each bargaining country’s welfare gains. We have not recalibrated the 
model as elasticities change, and have not changed the elasticities in computing non-cooperative equilibria import 
tariffs and NB solutions.   
Source: Calculated by the authors.   
We change all of the elasticities in production and consumption for each country 29 
 
simultaneously from 1.2 to 2.8. Results are presented in Table 7. 
It is clear that as elasticities increase, China’s welfare gain value will increase 
and the positive trend has not changed; in the meanwhile, OECD’s welfare gain value 
also increases as elasticities increase except when elasticities are equal to 1.6. 
Additionally China’s welfare gain share has nearly no change in every year under 
each elasticity value. This suggests that our simulation results are robust and credible.   
5.4 Welfare Gains When China, India and Brazil Jointly Bargain with the 
OECD  
China and other developing countries’ trade partners are mostly developed 
countries, and they often have trade disputes with developed countries. Thus, if China 
can join with other large developing countries to jointly bargain with the OECD, it 
will increase China’s bargaining power and yield more welfare gains.   
In this part we assume China joins with India and Brazil to jointly bargain with 
the OECD and then simulate their welfare gains. It is complicated to deal with four 
way bilateral bargaining, so we compute two-person bargaining solutions to simplify 
the calculation. We add China, India and Brazil together as one country, and this one 
bigger country bargains with the OECD. After we get the Nash equilibrium import 
tariff rates, we separate these countries again to compute each country’s welfare gain 
from the bargaining.   
We show the welfare gain results in this case in Table 8. For the welfare gain 
share, China’s share in 2010 is 40.5%, 64.2% in 2050 and 79.2% in 2100; this exceeds 
the OECD share in 2020. China receives most of the welfare gain, and then comes the 30 
 
OECD, but after 2080 India’s gain is also more than that of the OECD. Trends in 
welfare gain changes for each country are the same as for the shares. For the annual 
average growth rate, China’s and India’s growth rates are both higher than the 
OECD’s in all of the years.   
Table 8 Welfare Gains From Joint Bargaining by China, India, and Brazil 
Country  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060  2070  2080  2090  2100 
Share  
China  0.405 0.467 0.529 0.589 0.642 0.687 0.726 0.755 0.777 0.792 
OECD  0.445 0.388 0.330 0.275 0.224 0.179 0.140 0.109 0.084 0.065 
India  0.077 0.084 0.090 0.096 0.102 0.107 0.113 0.119 0.125 0.132 
Brazil  0.074 0.061 0.050 0.041 0.033 0.026 0.021 0.017 0.013 0.011 
Value  
China  150.8 319.9 680.0  1446.0 3081.4 6572.0 14076.7 30106.3 64770.0 139250
OECD  165.8 265.3 424.0 674.6 1074.7 1713.4 2724.8 4364.0 7012.6 11356.8
India 28.6  57.2  115.7  236.0 488.4 1025.4 2187.9 4736.4 10431.1 23267.2
Brazil 27.4  42.0  64.7  100.3 157.5 250.5 404.8 663.4  1107.2  1874.0
Annual Average Growth Rate   
China  /  11.2%   11.3%   11.3%  11.3%  11.3%  11.4%  11.4%   11.5%   11.5% 
OECD  /  6.0%   6.0%   5.9%  5.9%  5.9%  5.9%  6.0%   6.1%   6.2% 
India  /  10.0%   10.2%   10.4%  10.7%  11.0%  11.3%  11.6%   12.0%   12.3% 
Brazil  /  5.3%   5.4%   5.5%  5.7%  5.9%  6.2%  6.4%   6.7%   6.9% 
Source: Calculated by the authors.   
 
































































Source: Calculated by the authors.   
    We compare welfare gain values for China and the OECD under single NB with 31 
 
values under Joint NB in Figure 9. The results show that China will benefit more from 
joint bargaining in all years, and China’s welfare gain will increase about 40% under 
jointly bargaining. OECD’s welfare gain value shows nearly no change. Although the 
OECD suffers from China’s improved bargaining power it can also gain from the 
import tariff reductions by India and Brazil.   
Fig. 10 A Comparison of Welfare Gain Growth Rates under Joint NB and Single NB 
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Source: Calculated by the authors.   
     We compare the welfare gain growth rate for China and the OECD under NB in 
Figure 10. These results reveal that China’s gain growth rates under joint bargaining 
are higher than under single bargaining except in the year 2020. This means that 
China has benefitted from joint bargaining in terms of gain growth. OECD’s gain 
growth rate in the early years before 2060 is reduced by joint bargaining, but it also 
benefits from joint bargaining after 2060. The reason may be that as China and India 
become larger, the OECD can also benefit from their increased economic scale and 
demand.  
5.5 China’s Gain Over Time from Bargaining Under PPP 32 
 
A widely argued idea is that China’s foreign exchange rate has been undervalued 
and that the RMB’s real currency purchasing power is higher than its market rate 
measure. Therefore if we adjust China’s economic scale with PPP (Purchasing Power 
Parity) to simulate bargaining welfare gains, China’s gain may increase more. We 
choose a PPP conversion factor from the World Bank world development indicator 
database to adjust China’s economic size in base case data. From this database, the 
conversion indicator of US$/RMB¥ is 4 in 2008, not 6.83 as for the nominal exchange 
rate. After adjusting China’s economic scale for PPP and adjusting the benchmark 
data set and recalibrating the model, we compute bargaining solutions and welfare 
gains again and show the results in Table 9.   
Table 9 Welfare Gains from China-OECD Bargaining (NB) Under PPP 
Country 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060  2070  2080  2090  2100 
Share 
China  0.413   0.486   0.560   0.629  0.693  0.748  0.796  0.836   0.867   0.892 
OECD  0.587   0.514   0.440   0.371  0.307  0.252  0.204  0.164   0.133   0.108 
Value 
China 151.1  331.8  711.1  1511.4 3190.0 6638.4 13740.1 28069.6 56750 113630
OECD  214.4 350.3 558.2 892.4 1414.0 2235.2 3510.6 5515.9 8679.7  13699.2
Annual Average Growth Rate of Gains over the 10 Year Period 
China /  12.0%  11.4%  11.3% 11.1% 10.8% 10.7% 10.4%  10.2%  10.0%
OECD / 6.3%  5.9%  6.0% 5.8% 5.8% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.8% 
    Source:  Calculated  by  the  authors.  
These results suggest that China’s welfare gains from bargaining will exceed 
those of the OECD in 2030; and China’s share will reach 69.3% in 2050 and 89.2% in 
2100. China’s welfare gain values increase separately by about 21 times and 752 
times in 2050 and 2100 compared with 2010. For the welfare gain growth rate, China 
averages 10.8% and the OECD average is about 5.9%.   
    Figure  11  compares  welfare  gains  both for China and the OECD under PPP with 
gains under the market foreign exchange calculation. We find that both country 33 
 
welfare gain values have increased, and China’s gain has increased by about 37%. 
This implies that China’s increased scale has benefitted both itself and the OECD in 
absolute welfare gain from bargaining.   
Fig. 11 Comparison of Welfare Gains under Market Exchange Rates and PPP   


































Denote: MFE means market foreign exchange; PPP means purchase power parity.   
Source: Calculated by the authors.   
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Denote: MFE is market foreign exchange rate, PPP is purchase power parity. 
Source: Calculations by the authors.   
    Figure 12 presents comparisons of China’s and OECD’s gain shares and growth 34 
 
rates under PPP with results using market exchange rates. An apparent trend is the 
PPP adjustment to China’s economic scale which increases China’s gain share and 
decreases the OECD’s gain share. OECD’s gain growth rates also decline after PPP 
adjustment, but China’s gain growth rates increase before 2060 but decrease after 
2060 compared to results without PPP adjustment.   35 
 
6. Concluding Remarks   
We use a five country, two goods two factors per country general equilibrium 
model to numerically compute trade bargaining solutions and calculate China’s 
welfare gains from bargaining over time between 2010 and 2100 under different 
scenarios. Our findings are as follows.   
Firstly, China’s welfare gains from bargaining with the OECD increases over 
time if its GDP keeps its present high growth rate. By 2030 China’s gain will exceed 
that of the OECD. China’s share of the global welfare gain from cooperative Nash 
bargaining in 2010 is 41%, and increases to 54.8% in 2030, 67.7% in 2050 and 88.7% 
in 2100. China’s average annual growth rate of welfare gains from bargaining is about 
11%, a little higher than its GDP growth rate. OECD’s gain growth rate is about 6%, 
much higher than its GDP growth rate, which suggests China’s high growth will 
benefit the OECD.   
Second, under the KS-solution concept, China’s welfare gains from bargaining 
decrease before 2050 but increase later (after 2050) compared with NBS. The OECD 
is the contrary case. China’s welfare gain share in 2010 under the KS-solution is just 
10.6% but reaches 99.1% in 2100. Both countries show a gradually slower annual 
average growth rate, especially for the OECD, its growth rate after 2060 becomes 
negative. These results allow us to compare differences in numerical behavior for 
different solution concepts for NBS and KS-solution, which has not been done in 
previous literature.   
Third, when China joins with India and Brazil to jointly bargain with the OECD, 36 
 
its welfare gains from bargaining increase by about 40% compared with single 
bargaining results, and the annual average growth rate of its welfare gain increases to 
about 11.4%, a little higher than under single country bargaining. In the meanwhile, 
OECD’s welfare gains show almost no reduction compared with single bargaining 
results. Therefore, it is a useful strategy for China to join with other developing 
countries to improve its bargaining power.   
When we use PPP to adjust China’s economic scale, its welfare gains from 
bargaining increase about 37% compared with the results without a PPP adjustment; 
and China’s annual average growth rate of its welfare gain is about 10.8%, nearly the 
same as without PPP adjustment. These results suggest that China’s welfare gains 




Abrego, L., C. Perroni, J. Whalley and R.M. Wigle. 2001. “Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from 
Linked Negotiations”. Review of International Economics, 9(3), pp.414-428.   
Betina, V. D., R.A. McDougall and T.W. Hertel. 2006. “GTAP Version6 Documentation: Chapter 20 ‘Behavioral 
Parameters’ ” accessed at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/2906.pdf.  
Cahuc, P., F.P. Vinay and J.M. Robin. 2006. “Wage Bargaining With On-the Job Search: theory and Evidence”. 
Econometrica, 74(2), pp.323-364.   
Calmfors, L., J. Driffill, S. Honkapohja and F. Giavazzi. 1988. “Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and 
Macroeconomic Performance”. Economic Policy, 3(6), pp.13-61. 
Caroenter, J.P. 2002. “Evolutionary Models of Bargaining: Comparing Agent-based Computational and Analytical 
Approaches to Understanding Convention Evolution”. Computational Economics, 19, pp.25-49. 
Coles, M.G. and A. Muthoo. 1998. “Strategic Bargaining and Competitive Bidding in a Dynamic Market 
Equilibrium”. Review of Economic Studies, 65, pp.235-260.   
CSY. 2010. “China Statistical Yearbook”. Available at: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/  
Dong, Y. and J. Whalley. 2010. “Model Structure and The Combined Welfare and Trade Effects of China’s Trade 
Related Policies”. Global Economy Journal, 10(4), pp.1-19.   
Hoadley, S. and J. yang. 2008. “China’s Free Trade Negotiations: Economics, Security, and Diplomacy”. In The 
Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, pp.123-146. 
Johnson, H.G. 1965. “An Economic Theory of protectionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs 
Unions”. Journal of Political Economy, 73(3), pp.256-283.   
Johnson, E.J., C. Camerer, S. Sen and T. Rymon. 2002. “Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring 
Information Search in sequential Bargaining”. Journal of Economic Theory, 104, pp.16-47. 
Kalai, E. 1985. “Solutions to the Bargaining Problem”. In: L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein, Eds, 
Social Goals and Social Organization, Essays in memory of E. Pazner. Cambridage University Press, 
pp.77-105. 
Kalai, E. and M. Smorodinsky. 1975. “Other Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining problem”. Econometrica, 43(3), 
pp.513-518. 
Kennan, J. 2010. “Private Information, Wage Bargaining and Employment Fluctuations”. Review of Economic 
Studies, 77, pp.633-664. 
MCS. 2010. “Ministry of Commerce Statistics of China”. http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/tongjiziliao/tongjiziliao.html  
Nash, J.F. 1950. “The Bargaining Problem”. Econometrica, 28, pp.155-162. 
Nash, J.F. 1951. “Non-cooperative Games”. Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), pp.286-295.   
Peters, H.J.M. 1987. “Some Axiomatic Aspects of Bargaining”. In: J.H.P. Paelinck and P.H. Vossen, Eds., 
Axiomatics and Pragmatics of conflict Analysis. Aldershot, UK: Gower Press, pp.112-141.   
Peters, H.J.M. 1992. “Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory”. Theory and Decision Library, Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers.   
Roth, A.E. 1979. “Axiomatic Models of Bargaining”. Berlin and New York: Springer-Verlag, No.170.   
Roth, A.E., V. Prasnikar, M.O. Fujiwara and S. Zamir. 1991. “Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, 
Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study”. The American Economic Review, 81(5), 
pp.1068-1095. 
Rubinstein, A. 1982. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”. Econometrica, 50(1), pp.97-109. 
Shoven, J.B. and J. Whalley. 1992. “Applying General Equilibrium”. Cambridge University Press.   
Thomson, W. 1983. “Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution”. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.31, 
pp.211-226.  
Thomson, W. 1985. “Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Population: A Survey of Recent Results”. In: 
A.E. Roth, ed. Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge University Press, pp.233-258.   
Thomson, W. 1994. “Cooperative Models of Bargaining”. In: R.J. Aumann and S. Hart, Handbook of Game 
Theory, Vol.2.   
Trejos, A. and R. Wright. 1995. “Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices”. Journal of Political Economy, 103(1), 
pp.118-141.  
Trifon, R. and M. Landau. 1974. “A Model of Wage Bargaining Involving Negotiations and Sanctions”. 
Management Science, 20(6), pp.960-970.   
UN. 2010. “United Nations Interactive Graphic System of International Economic Trends Data (SIGCI Plus)”. 
Data available at: http://www.eclac.org/comercio/ecdata2/index.html.  
Whalley, J. and L. Wang. 2010. “The Impact of Renminbi Appreciation on Trade Flows and Reserve Accumulation 
in a Monetary Trade Model”. Economic Modelling, 28, pp.614-621.   